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The Once and (Maybe) Future Klein 
Principle 
William D. Araiza* 
Abstract 
This Response considers Evan Zoldan’s argument, set forth in 
his recently-published Article, that one can find a coherent 
principle underlying the vexing case of United States v. Klein in 
the idea that government is prohibited from what Zoldan calls 
“self-dealing.” The promise is a seductive one: Klein, and in 
particular its language prohibiting Congress from dictating “rules 
of decision” to courts, has puzzled scholars for generations. As 
Zoldan explains, other understandings of Klein all encounter 
significant obstacles in the form of precedent that rebut other 
explanations of what that case really means. 
Unfortunately, Zoldan’s valiant and careful effort encounters 
serious difficulties of its own. His self-dealing prohibition 
arguably conflicts with an early post-Klein case, Eslin v. District 
of Columbia, and conflicts even more seriously with the Court’s 
most recent case to consider Klein, Patchak v. Zinke, which was 
decided after Zoldan published his article. There is also reason to 
question the practical workability and conceptual coherence of the 
self-dealing prohibition Zoldan offers. 
But Patchak also offers hope for those, like Zoldan, who see 
worth in the possible normative values implicit in Klein. Patchak 
featured a not-insignificant line-up of justices who expressed 
sympathy with a meaningful reading of Klein as a limit on 
Congress’s power to legislate in hyper-specific ways and ways that 
leave no role for judicial analysis. Ironically, then, while Patchak 
calls into serious question Zoldan’s solution to the Klein puzzle, it 
also offers hope that the Court might eventually embrace a more 
meaningful Klein principle. 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to the editors of the 
Washington & Lee Law Review for the invitation to publish this Response. 
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Evan Zoldan has written important work on the 
constitutional principle of legislative generality and on 
constitutional limits on the form legislation takes.1 In the work 
this Response addresses,2 he has (again)3 engaged the Great 
While Whale of federal courts scholarship—the vexing case of 
United States v. Klein4—through a similar lens. He has argued 
that the principle of legislative generality, and in particular its 
opposition not just to singling out, but to singling out that favors 
the government, provides the best way to understand Klein. He 
describes this as a principle prohibiting government 
“self-dealing.” There is a great deal to admire in this effort. 
Zoldan is right that legislative generality is—or at least, should 
be—“a principle of constitutional dimension.”5 In addition, Zoldan 
has done very careful analysis of Klein in his attempt to craft a 
doctrinal rule that is both workable and still consistent with at 
least most of extant precedent.6  
But the attempt falters. As this Response suggests, the 
self-dealing principle that Zoldan offers is likely a very difficult 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally Evan C. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component of 
Legislative Generality, 51 RICH. L. REV. 489 (2017); Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving 
Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625 (2014). 
 2. Evan Zoldan, The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing 
Solution, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The Klein 
Rule]. 
 3. See generally Evan C. Zoldan, Bank Markazi and the Undervaluation of 
Legislative Generality, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1 (2016). 
 4. 80 U.S. 129 (1871). 
 5. Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2152. 
 6. Zoldan recognizes that his proffered reading of Klein stands in at least 
some tension with one important post-Klein precedent. See infra note 60 and 
accompanying text. 
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one to apply in any principled way—not just as a matter of courts 
being able to discern when self-dealing lurks in a given 
government action, but also as a more conceptual matter of 
understanding self-dealing emanating from a sovereign. 
Moreover, the Court’s most recent engagement with Klein—its 
February 2018 decision in Patchak v. Zinke7—raises questions 
about the viability of Zoldan’s self-dealing reading of Klein. There 
is good reason to be disheartened by the result in Patchak. But it 
also provides reason for hope, given that the prevailing side was 
fractured, that one of the six votes on that side remains 
sympathetic to a stronger reading of Klein,8 and that the newest 
Justice, Justice Gorsuch, voted with the dissent.9 These 
developments suggest that the struggle to craft a meaningful 
understanding of Klein is not over. But, paradoxically, they also 
suggest that that understanding may ultimately come to rest on 
considerations different from those offered by Zoldan in his 
excellent and careful analysis. After Part I sets forth the 
challenge Klein poses, Part II examines Zoldan’s self-dealing 
principle and its difficulties. Part III concludes by briefly 
discussing Patchak and the potential it carries for a meaningful 
understanding of Klein. 
I. The Puzzle of Klein 
Klein is a deeply puzzling case. To summarize the facts,10 
after the Civil War, Klein, the executor of the estate of a former 
confederate named Wilson, sued the federal government to 
recover the proceeds of the sale of Wilson’s cotton that Union 
forces confiscated during the war. Wilson, who had taken an oath 
of loyalty to the Union, had been pardoned by the President, and 
thus was considered a loyal citizen based on a Supreme Court 
decision that had interpreted presidential pardons as cleansing 
any taint of treason from those accepting them.11 Klein thus sued 
                                                                                                     
 7. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018). 
 8. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 9. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 914. 
 10. For a fuller statement of Klein’s facts, see Zoldan, The Klein Rule, 
supra note 2, at 2144–46. 
 11. See generally United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531 (1870) (construing 
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under a Civil War-era law that both authorized seizure of enemy 
property but also guaranteed the property rights of loyal citizens, 
a group that included Wilson, based on the effect of the pardon as 
understood by the Court.12 
While Klein’s suit was pending in the federal courts, 
Congress enacted a law that denied recovery for persons in 
Wilson’s position.13 That law required courts to interpret a 
person’s receipt of a presidential pardon as evidence of disloyalty, 
unless the person’s acceptance of the pardon was accompanied by 
a denial of the underlying charge.14 It further specified that when 
a plaintiff relied on such a pardon as support for his 
compensation claim, the court should dismiss the cause “for want 
of jurisdiction.”15  
In Klein, the Court struck that law down.16 After providing 
an extended discussion of the history of presidential pardon offers 
extended during and immediately after the Civil War,17 and 
explaining the constitutional status of the Court of Claims (where 
Klein originally brought the suit),18 the Court moved directly into 
its famous language prohibiting Congress from “prescrib[ing] a 
rule for the decision of a cause in a particular case.”19 After a two 
page discussion of that issue,20 the Court then observed, almost 
as an afterthought, that “[t]he rule prescribed is also liable to just 
exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing 
the constitutional power of the Executive.”21 Thus, the Court very 
strongly suggested that its discussion of the “rule of decision” 
issue, while surely connected to the constitutional status of a 
pardon, pointed to a problem with the statute separate and 
                                                                                                     
the effect of a presidential pardon). 
 12. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 129, 148 (1871). 
 13. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 1, 16 Stat. 230, 235. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 147 (“We must think that Congress has 
inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial 
power.”). 
 17. Id. at 139–42. 
 18. Id. at 144–45. 
 19. Id. at 146. 
 20. Id. at 146–47. 
 21. Id. at 147. 
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distinct from its attack on the executive branch—that is, the 
Court suggested that the statute also had the effect of 
unconstitutionally interfering with the judicial power.22 
It is the statute’s latter, Article III-based infirmity that has 
puzzled scholars ever since. On its face, the idea that Congress 
acts unconstitutionally when it “prescribe[s] rules of decision”23 
seems to collide with the reality that any legislation effectively 
does exactly that.24 Scholars have attempted to square this 
reality with Klein’s statements by focusing on several aspects of 
legislation that might render it problematic: most notably, a law’s 
retroactivity, hyper-narrowness, reference to particular cases 
whose results the law intends to affect, or positive impact on the 
government’s litigating position in a case involving the 
government. As Zoldan carefully explains, all of these 
explanations for Klein, as well as others that he offers, come up 
short, either as a matter of logic or precedent.25 
II. The Self-Dealing Theory 
Zoldan offers another explanation for Klein. He argues that 
Klein and cases that have engaged it can be understood as 
reflecting a rule against government “self-dealing.”26 As Zoldan 
explains it, under this principle “when a statute is drawn 
narrowly to benefit the government in a particular set of cases, or 
                                                                                                     
 22. Justice Miller’s dissent also described its holding in terms of Congress’s 
asserted attempt to prescribe to the judiciary the effect of a presidential pardon. 
Id. at 148 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. at 146. 
 24. See generally, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: 
Equal Protection, The Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory 
Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1079 (1999). 
 25. See generally Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2 at 2148–73. That 
precedent includes Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S.Ct. 1310 (2016). In Bank 
Markazi, the Court upheld a statute that made available the assets of the 
Iranian state bank to satisfy judgments finding the Iranian Government 
responsible for acts of terrorism. Id. at 1317. A seven-justice majority cast doubt 
on the bank’s argument that hyper-specific legislation is inherently problematic, 
and rejected the argument that the statute left nothing for courts to decide and 
thus dictated a result. Id. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Sotomayor, 
dissented. Id. at 1329. 
 26. See, e.g., Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2193 (referring to 
what Zoldan calls “the Klein Self-Dealing Principle”). 
388 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 383 (2018) 
necessarily will run to the advantage of the government in all 
situations, a statute self-deals within the meaning of this 
principle.”27 He cautions, however, that the kind of self-dealing he 
views as condemned by Klein does not include such laws that 
benefit the government when that benefit is designed to 
“accomplish . . . a broader governmental objective.”28 Zoldan 
argues that this principle explains both Klein29 and “most rule of 
decision cases.”30 
Zoldan’s self-dealing principle is an attractive one. As he 
notes, it reflects a broader jurisprudential commitment to 
government neutrality—in this case, a prohibition on government 
skewing the scales of justice by using its lawmaking power to 
force a decision in its favor in a case that implicates the 
government not as a policy-maker but simply as an interested 
litigator, no more deserving than any other litigator to fix the 
rules by which its liability is determined.31 It also reflects, if 
indirectly, Zoldan’s focus on legislative generality—that is, the 
disfavor with which constitutional law looks, or should look, on 
government action that precisely targets one winner and one 
loser. Indeed, his self-dealing principle targets the most egregious 
form of such singling out—singling out that benefits the 
government itself, for no public purpose. Nevertheless, that 
principle, like all principles that have been offered to explain 
Klein, encounters difficulties.  
A. Self-Dealing as Applied to Klein 
First, consider Klein itself. Zoldan concludes that the statute 
in Klein violates the self-dealing principle because it always 
benefits the government, and only the government. Importantly, 
he writes that that law “did not establish a broader governmental 
policy within the meaning of [the] self-dealing principle.”32 But 
it’s not clear what Zoldan means by that statement. At the end of 
                                                                                                     
 27. Id. at 2190. 
 28. Id. at 2193–94. 
 29. Id. at 2194–96. 
 30. Id. at 2197; see also id. at 2197–2216. 
 31. Id. at 2174–79. 
 32. Id. at 2196. 
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the Article, he offers a series of examples of laws that implicate 
that principle, all dealing with an environmental protection law 
to which Congress legislates a set of different exemptions relating 
to the operation of power plants. He identifies one such 
exemption—exempting from the law a particular plant 
constructed and operated by the federal government and 
identified in the law33—as most likely to violate Klein. According 
to Zoldan, this is because that exemption reflects no general 
policy addressing power generation; rather, it simply decrees that 
the environmental impairment the original law seeks to prevent 
is not implicated by the particular facility identified in the 
statute.34 
But it’s not clear why laws such as his hypothetical power 
plant exemption should be thought of as not “establish[ing] a 
broader governmental policy,” unless, by definition, governmental 
policy cannot be “establish[ed]” in a targeted way. For example, it 
would presumably be perfectly coherent for government to 
conclude that a particular power station is a crucial part of the 
national or local power infrastructure, such that ensuring its 
continued existence reflects perfectly sound policy—and, more 
relevantly for our purposes, “policy” of any sort.35 To be sure, at 
other points in his analysis Zoldan seems to suggest that 
legislation that otherwise appears to be self-dealing is not so if 
the benefits it confers only on the government inure to the public 
more generally.36 Nevertheless, Zoldan’s suggestion that this 
                                                                                                     
 33. The hypothetical law in question accomplishes this exception in a 
manner calling to mind the statute in Robertson, that is, by referring to the 
structure identified in the lawsuit the statute seeks to end. 
 34. See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2223–25; see also 
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (upholding a law that 
“determined and directed” that new obligations imposed on the federal 
government satisfied the obligations imposed by the statutes identified in two 
particular federal court cases identified by names and case numbers). 
 35. Cf. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 129, 146–47 (1871) (distinguishing 
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855), 
which upheld a law identifying a particular bridge as a post road and nullified 
its previous status as a nuisance, on the ground that the law simply created a 
new state of affairs that would be applied to any relevant future case). 
 36. See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2192–93 (“[I]f the change 
in law abrogates an obligation of the government only incidental to the 
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective, or benefits someone other 
than the government, then it amends applicable law and must be applied by the 
390 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 383 (2018) 
targeted exemption would likely fail his self-dealing principle 
presumably means that that exemption does not establish policy, 
as Zoldan uses that term. This result would suggest that a great 
deal of government decision-making would become subject to 
judicial invalidation. But even the self-dealing inquiry itself, so 
understood, would raise concerns, to the extent it would require 
courts to determine whether such a particularized exemption 
does in fact establish broader public policy. One would think that 
courts performing such an inquiry would need to exhibit some 
measure of deference to the government’s argument that the 
challenged law, despite its narrowness, did in fact legitimately 
establish policy for the public benefit. Of course, such deference, 
if applied liberally, might effectively validate self-dealing.37 
Zoldan’s application of this principle to Klein itself raises this 
issue. To be sure, the law in Klein was not the sort of 
narrowly-targeted law that he hypothesizes toward the end of the 
Article. After all, the statute in Klein applied to everyone in 
Wilson’s position. But for Zoldan, the Klein law nevertheless 
failed the self-dealing test, because “whatever the motivations of 
Congress for doing so, the effect of the proviso [at issue in Klein] 
was only to relieve the government of its obligations under the 
[law allowing loyal southerners to recover their property], not to 
set public policy.”38 But this is just an assertion. It is just as 
reasonable to assert that the effect of that proviso was to prevent 
overly-generous pardoning action by the President, and 
overly-generous judicial interpretations of such pardons, from 
inappropriately lightening the burdens to be borne by people who 
were factually disloyal to the Union during the war. Of course, 
such a policy might be beyond Congress’s power to enact, since 
that policy might interfere with either the President’s pardoning 
power and/or the courts’ power to construe the effects of pardons. 
But that is a different rationale for striking the proviso down. 
Indeed, it’s the rationale that all scholars of Klein take as 
relatively unexceptional. The rationale that Zoldan cares about—
                                                                                                     
court.”). 
 37. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (employing highly 
deferential review to uphold against equal protection and due process challenges 
a law that might well have been motivated by private party rent-seeking). 
 38. Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2196. 
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the prohibition on legislative prescriptions of “rules of decision”—
is explained by Zoldan’s self-dealing rationale only if one is 
willing to take a narrow view of what counts as legitimate public 
policy, and, by extension, only if one is willing to take a very 
broad view of courts’ power to second-guess the assertion that 
such laws do indeed promote some public good. 
B. Self-Dealing In Post-Klein Cases 
1. The Easy Cases 
Zoldan divides the most important cases engaging Klein into 
several categories.39 The first category, which he discusses only 
briefly,40 involves cases where the government has legislated to 
favor one private party over another private party, rather than 
the government as litigator over its litigation adversary. Zoldan 
considers these easy cases for his self-dealing principle. And they 
are, for the obvious reason the government can be presumed not 
to gain a direct benefit from a ruling in favor of one private party 
as opposed to the other.41  
The second category of cases involves the government as a 
party, but features legislation that favors the private party in the 
case. He includes in this category the venerable case The 
Schooner Peggy,42 in which the Supreme Court enforced the terms 
of a treaty that required the return of a vessel previously claimed 
as a prize, even though the treaty was concluded after the lower 
court had ruled in favor of the vessel’s status as a prize (a status 
that inured partially to the benefit of the United States). Nearly 
two centuries later, in United States v. Sioux Nation,43 the Court 
upheld a law that waived the federal government’s defense of res 
judicata in litigation involving the government as a defendant. In 
                                                                                                     
 39. This Response does not address each case Zoldan discusses, but does 
discuss each category. See generally Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 
2197–2216. One of the important cases Zoldan discusses, District of Columbia v. 
Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901), is discussed later in this Response. Infra Part II.B.2. 
 40. Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2197–98. 
 41. Id. at 2198. 
 42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). 
 43. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
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so doing, the Court distinguished Klein on the ground that the 
statute in Sioux Nation operated to disadvantage the 
government.44 These cases also are self-explanatory as 
illustrations of Zoldan’s self-dealing principle. 
 
 
2. The Harder Cases 
But then harder cases arise. Zoldan begins with Robertson v. 
Seattle Audubon Society,45 a 1992 case in which the Court 
unanimously rejected a Klein-based challenge to the “Northwest 
Timber Compromise,” (Compromise) a federal law that sought to 
resolve a dispute between logging and environmental interests in 
the Pacific Northwest. The dispute took the form of two lawsuits, 
brought by, respectively, the Portland and Seattle chapters of the 
National Audubon Society.46 Those lawsuits alleged that federal 
management of old-growth forests in the Northwest violated 
several federal laws, including the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and 
the National Environmental Policy Act. While those suits were 
pending, Congress brokered a compromise. That compromise 
imposed new requirements on federal management of those 
forests, but also “determine[d] and direct[ed]” that satisfaction of 
those new requirements  
is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the 
statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated 
cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale 
Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers 
Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order 
granting preliminary injunction) and the case Portland 
Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-
1160-FR.47  
                                                                                                     
 44. Id. at 405; see also Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2200. 
 45. 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
 46. See id. at 434 (quoting the federal statute that in turn identified the 
lawsuits brought by both organizations). 
 47. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 745 (1989). 
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A unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit held that this provision 
prescribed a rule of decision, and thus violated Klein.48 As noted 
above, a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed.49 
As Zoldan acknowledges,50 Robertson presents a difficult 
challenge for scholars seeking to explain Klein. On the one hand, 
“determin[ing] and direct[ing]” that satisfaction of the 
Compromise’s new requirements for federal land management is 
“adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory 
requirements” the plaintiffs cited in their lawsuits appears on its 
face to force courts to reach certain results, a seemingly clear 
violation of Klein’s rule of decision prohibition. On the other 
hand, a moment’s reflection should lead one to the conclusion 
ultimately reached by the Supreme Court, namely, that this 
provision simply amended those underlying laws, to make them 
inapplicable in the context of the lawsuits the provision 
identified. Surely, this is not the most transparent way of making 
law. But, according to the Supreme Court, it remains lawmaking. 
But if that is true, then what remains of Klein’s rule of decision 
prohibition? 
Zoldan argues that the self-dealing principle explains 
Robertson, in two ways.51 First, he observes that the Compromise 
imposes real obligations on the government, and leaves open the 
prospect of future litigation against the government if it defaults 
on those obligations.52 Thus, this is not a situation like Klein 
itself where, without having to do anything substantive, the 
government necessarily wins as a result of the statute. Second, he 
argues that the Compromise achieved a public purpose beyond 
simply lifting a burden on the government.53 Rather, the 
                                                                                                     
 48. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 49. See Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437. 
 50. See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2201 (“The difficult 
Robertson decision has long been considered a significant challenge to the 
articulation of a viable Klein principle.”). 
 51. Id. at 2201–07. 
 52. Id. at 2204–05. 
 53. Zoldan does concede that the Compromise likely lifted burdens on the 
government, since the new requirements the Compromise imposed on the 
government were less onerous than those in the laws that the Compromise 
effectively partially repealed. See id. at 2205  
Certainly, some part of the impact of the Compromise relieved the 
government of an obligation; at the least, it was relieved of its 
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Compromise successfully mediated the conflicting demands of 
logging and environmental interests, and as such, established 
effective government policy. 
Zoldan’s analysis of Robertson is lawyerly and careful. 
Nevertheless, it leaves unanswered important questions about 
workability of his self-dealing principle. First, once one gets past 
a statute that necessarily results in a complete victory for the 
government, it becomes difficult to draw a coherent line 
separating laws that unconstitutionally self-deal and those for 
which the self-dealing aspect is only a part of the law’s effect. 
Robertson illustrates this problem. Zoldan’s self-dealing principle 
requires that a “substantial” part of the challenged law’s impact 
consist not simply in lifting a burden from the government.54 
Consider the difficulty this standard imposes on courts. For 
example, what if, instead of imposing the requirements the 
Compromise actually placed on the government, it instead 
imposed a very rudimentary requirement—say, a requirement 
that government simply keep records of the number of trees 
harvested? One could argue that such a requirement, trivial as it 
is, remains substantive: for example, one could suggest that such 
record-keeping could spur future legislative efforts to protect the 
forests, once the extent of the logging became clear. Would that 
count as substantial enough an obligation to defeat the 
self-dealing claim? How would a court decide? 
Zoldan’s second explanation for the Compromise’s 
constitutionality is even more susceptible to a critique based on 
the difficulty of line-drawing, and, ultimately, on judicial 
competence. Zoldan notes that the Compromise established public 
policy rather than simply benefitting the government as a 
litigant. But the assumption underlying this rule—that courts 
are able to tell the difference between government policy-making 
and government actions taken simply to benefit itself as a 
litigator—may be difficult to vindicate. Consider a governmental 
decision to cut off all lawsuits against it by asserting sovereign 
                                                                                                     
obligation to litigate the cases referenced in the Compromise. 
Further, to the extent that the obligations of (b)(3) and (b)(5) were 
less onerous than the statutory obligations provided by generally 
applicable environmental statutes, the government was relieved of 
those burdens as well. 
 54. Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2193. 
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immunity, or even simply sovereign immunity to suits seeking 
damages or other retrospective relief. The Court has 
acknowledged, most notably in its state sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence, that government immunity from lawsuits or at 
least from certain types of relief provide important public 
benefits.55 If such assertions of sovereign immunity can be 
defended on public policy grounds then, again, how can courts 
competently draw a line separating laws whose predominant 
effect is simply to benefit the government as a litigator, and those 
that feature a greater proportion of public policy benefits relative 
to those self-dealing benefits? This latter critique repeats this 
Response’s questions about how the self-dealing principle would 
apply to Klein itself.56 That same critique applies here—as, 
indeed, it would to any application of the policy-making exception 
to the self-dealing prohibition.  
Finally, Zoldan considers District of Columbia v. Eslin.57 In 
Eslin the Court upheld a statute that vacated creditors’ 
judgments against the District of Columbia government. That 
statute repealed an earlier federal law that had both made the 
federal government liable for the District’s debts and allowed 
creditors of the District’s public works board to renew lawsuits 
that had previously been dismissed. An important part of this 
convoluted story is that, at the time, the D.C. government was 
not a federal entity.58 This oddity allows Zoldan to read to its 
fullest extent Eslin’s language that the federal government’s 
initial shouldering of the District’s debt liabilities constituted an 
act of grace, which Congress was thus free to abandon without 
constitutional consequence.59 
Zoldan acknowledges that this reading of Eslin “is not free of 
difficulty.”60 As he explains, one could argue that the federal 
                                                                                                     
 55. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751–52 (1999) (noting the 
accountability benefits state governments enjoy when they are able to avoid 
lawsuits seeking retrospective relief). 
 56. Supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 57. District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901). 
 58. See Zoldan, The Klein Rule, supra note 2, at 2213 (“When the District 
became indebted for the work that was the subject of Eslin’s claims, the District 
was, for relevant purposes, not the United States government.”). 
 59. Id. at 2213–15. 
 60. Id. at 2214. 
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government in Eslin had shouldered the same obligation to pay 
the District’s debts as it had shouldered in Klein after the 
Supreme Court decided that a pardon did in fact erase the label 
“disloyal” that previously would have disqualified Wilson’s estate 
from seeking reimbursement for his seized cotton.61 Nevertheless, 
he concludes that this reading is the best way to harmonize Klein 
and Eslin,62 the latter case, as he notes, not even bothering to cite 
Klein.63  
The space limitations of this Response preclude a deep 
engagement with Zoldan’s reading of Eslin, which, at any rate, is 
tangential to the underlying question of the self-dealing 
principle’s viability. For that narrower purpose, Zoldan’s reading 
of Eslin is important because it forces us to consider the 
distinction between government obligation and government 
grace, and whether that distinction provides a stable foundation 
for a general principle prohibiting self-dealing. The next Part 
takes up this work, albeit briefly. 
III. Patchak and the Possibility of Another Reading of Klein 
In Patchak v. Zinke,64 decided after the publication of 
Zoldan’s Article, the Court returned, for the second time in as 
many years,65 to the question of Klein’s meaning. In Patchak, a 
sharply divided Court upheld a federal law governing legal claims 
relating to a parcel of land that the Secretary of the Interior took 
into trust for the benefit of a Native tribe that desired the land 
for a casino.66 After a neighboring landowner’s lawsuit 
challenging the Secretary’s decision enjoyed preliminary 
success,67 Congress enacted the law in question. Section 2(a) of 
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 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 2172. 
 64. 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018). 
 65. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S.Ct. 1310 (2016). Zoldan mentions 
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that law—unchallenged in Patchak—“ratified and confirmed” the 
Secretary’s decision to take the land into trust. Section 2(b)—the 
provision at issue in Patchak—reads as follows:  
NO CLAIMS.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of 
the date of enactment of this Act) relating to the land 
described in subsection (a) shall not be filed or maintained in a 
Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.68 
A six-justice majority upheld this law. Writing for four of 
those justices, Justice Thomas concluded that Section 2(b) 
constituted a stripping of federal court jurisdiction over claims 
such as Patchak’s, and that such jurisdiction stripping was a 
valid use of Congress’s power to set the jurisdiction of federal 
courts. He acknowledged that the Constitution prevents Congress 
from “compel[ling] . . . findings or results under old law,”69 but he 
concluded that Section 2(b)’s jurisdiction stripping changed the 
law, and did so for “an open-ended class of disputes.”70 
Justice Breyer concurred, concluding that Section 2(b) was 
simply a housekeeping measure that ensured the effectiveness of 
Section 2(a)’s confirmation of the parcel’s status as trust land.71 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurred only in 
the judgment. She concluded that Section 2(b) should be 
construed as the government’s reassertion of the sovereign 
immunity it had waived when it enacted the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the statute under which Patchak sued.72 
Importantly, Justice Sotomayor wrote her own concurrence in the 
judgment, to reiterate her agreement with Justice Ginsburg’s 
sovereign immunity conclusion, but also to stress her agreement 
with much of the dissent’s analysis.73 
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 68. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 69. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 901 (internal quotation omitted). 
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 71. Id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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 73. Id. at 913 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy and 
Gorsuch, dissented.74 Disputing the characterizations of Section 
2(b) as either a jurisdiction-stripping statute75 or an assertion of 
sovereign immunity,76 he insisted that that provision left nothing 
for courts to decide and thus did not establish a new legal rule. 
He also insisted that Section 2(b) compelled a result in a single 
case, given the expiration of the limitations period on any 
possible future challenges to the trust status of the property. 
Indeed, even assuming that Section 2(b) was properly understood 
as a jurisdiction-stripping provision, he still argued that it 
violated the Constitution by compelling a result in one and only 
one case, thus violating his belief that “the concept of ‘changing 
the law’ must imply some measure of generality or preservation 
of an adjudicative role for the courts.”77 
The Court’s decision in Patchak illustrates both the limits of 
Klein today but also the potential for a meaningful Klein rule in 
the future. First, Patchak is difficult to square with any 
self-dealing limitation on congressional power. The hard fact of 
the matter is that in Patchak a majority allowed Congress to 
ensure that the federal government would prevail in any 
challenge to its decision taking into trust the property in 
question. Indeed, regardless of its characterization as a 
jurisdiction stripping provision or a reassertion of federal 
sovereign immunity, Section 2(b) ensured that any such challenge 
could not even be heard on the merits. This result conflicts with 
Zoldan’s self-dealing principle, unless that principle allows for 
such avoidance on the theory that the federal sovereign’s 
amenability to suit is purely a matter of grace. In that latter case, 
the self-dealing principle leaves open a major loophole, given that 
either such characterization of a law would constitute a highly 
attractive vehicle for government to accomplish exactly what 
Zoldan urges it should be prohibited from accomplishing. 
Nevertheless, and perhaps ironically, the voting in Patchak 
raises hope that the justices may yet possess some appetite for a 
meaningful understanding of Klein. First, Chief Justice Roberts’ 
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dissent garnered two new adherents that he did not have in his 
Bank Markazi dissent. To be sure, he lost his only supporter from 
Bank Markazi—Justice Sotomayor—but the fact that in Patchak 
she agreed with much of his reasoning suggests that her vote is 
eminently gettable. Just as heartening is the fact that Chief 
Justice Roberts’ Patchak dissent was a full-throated insistence on 
legislative generality and a realistically meaningful judicial role 
in applying statutes. The fact that that insistence gained the 
votes of two other justices, and the sympathy of a third, suggests 
that the Court is in fact closely split on the possibility of 
resurrecting a meaningful Klein principle, just as the last 
remaining plausible Article III-based reading of Klein—
Zoldan’s—appears less and less viable as a matter of existing 
precedent. 
